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ABSTRACT
Labor supply theory predicts systematic heterogeneity in the impact of recent welfare reforms on
earnings, transfers, and income. Yet most welfare reform research focuses on mean impacts. We
investigate the importance of heterogeneity using random-assignment data from Connecticut's Jobs
First waiver, which features key elements of post-1996 welfare programs. Estimated quantile
treatment effects exhibit the substantial heterogeneity predicted by labor supply theory. Thus mean
impacts miss a great deal. Looking separately at dropouts and other women does not improve the
performance of mean impacts. Evaluating Jobs First relative to AFDC using a class of social welfare
functions, we find that Jobs First's performance depends on the degree of inequality aversion, the
relative valuation of earnings and transfers, and whether one accounts for Jobs First's greater costs.
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Several years have now passed since the elimination of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), the principal U.S. cash assistance program for six decades. In 1996, enactment of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) required all 50
states to replace AFDC with a Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. State
TANF programs dier from AFDC in many fundamental ways. Key examples include lifetime
limits on program participation, enhanced work incentives through expanded earnings disregards,
stringent work requirements, and nancial sanctions for failure to comply with these requirements.
A critical element in evaluating this dramatic policy change is measuring the impact of TANF on
earnings and income. In this paper, we focus on heterogeneity of the eects of these reforms. This
should be a key issue for evaluating welfare reform, because labor supply theory makes very strong
predictions concerning heterogeneity in both the sign and magnitude of labor supply responses to
recent reforms. As a consequence, mean impacts will tend to average together positive and negative
labor supply responses, possibly obscuring the extent of welfare reform's eects.
Despite the theoretical indeterminacy of mean impacts, most existing research on welfare reform
and earnings takes that approach.1 Several studies use nonexperimental data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) to examine the impact of PRWORA, and the state waivers that preceded
it, on income. Evidence from these studies is mixed. For example, Mott (1999) nds no impact
of waivers on family income, while Grogger (Forthcoming) nds that welfare reform increased
mean income for female heads of household. Further, experimental studies examining state reforms
implemented before 1996 via TANF-like waivers suggest that generous increases in the earnings
disregards are important for generating mean income gains. However, these gains disappear after
time limits (Bloom & Michalopoulos (2001), Grogger et al. (2002)).
In this paper, we shift attention away from mean impacts. Instead we allow for heterogeneous
impacts of welfare reform by estimating quantile treatment eects (QTE). We use public-use data
les from the Manpower Demonstration and Research Corporation's (MDRC) experimental eval-
uation of Connecticut's Jobs First waiver. The evaluation was conducted over a ve-year period
1The welfare reform literature that has developed in the last several years is enormous. We conne our discussion of
this literature to a few papers having particular relevance to our study of income and heterogeneity. For comprehensive
summaries of this research, see the excellent reviews by Blank (2002), Mott (2002), and Grogger, Karoly & Klerman
(2002).
1beginning in 1996. Experimental data also are available for waiver demonstrations in other states.
We focus on Jobs First because of its radical increase in the earnings disregard and its very short
(21-month) time limit. Along these lines, Jobs First may be viewed as something of a supercharged
version of many states' TANF programs. Thus it provides an excellent opportunity to study the
impacts of these key reforms.
Our choice to use experimental data and methods is not incidental. As discussed in Blank (2002)
and formalized in Bitler, Gelbach & Hoynes (2003, (Papers and Proceedings)), identifying the
impact of TANF using nonexperimental methods is dicult given that (i) TANF was implemented
in all states within a very short period, and (ii) the implementation took place during the strongest
economic expansion in decades. Since the relevance of many of our ndings lies in the ability of
our techniques to detect heterogeneous treatment eects, we believe it is critical that our results
not depend importantly on nuisance issues related to selection bias. To this end, experimental data
provides a setting where identication is clear and essentially incontrovertible.
Our emphasis on heterogeneity is motivated partly because policymakers and researchers care
directly about it. For example, in a recent Joint Center for Poverty Research newsletter entitled
\What Policymakers Want to Know," Cabrera & Evans (2000) ask \What is the variability of
response to welfare reform among families?...Typically, research ndings are reported in terms of
the average response of the welfare reform population with respect to some behavior or status of
interest. This focus diverts attention from the subgroup of families that might be struggling, even
when most are not." Such concerns have led a small number of authors to consider distributional
concerns. Schoeni & Blank (2003 (Papers and Proceedings)) compare the full distribution of the
income-to-needs ratio before and after TANF, nding increases at all but the very lowest percentiles.
However, as the authors note, their simple before-and-after methods cannot distinguish impacts of
TANF from the eects of strong labor markets. With the exception of these results and those in a
few other sources,2 the most common approach to addressing distributional concerns is to estimate
mean impacts for subgroups of the population (dened using education, race, and welfare and
2Schoeni & Blank (2000) compare the 20th and 50th percentiles of the CPS family income distribution before and
after implementation of TANF. They nd negative (but insignicant) impacts of TANF on the 20th percentile, and
positive and signicant impacts on the 50th percentile for a sample of women with less than a high school education.
Some of the MDRC waiver evaluations (e.g., Bloom, Scrivener, Michalopoulos, Morris, Hendra, Adams-Ciardullo
& Walter (2002) and Bloom, Kemple, Morris, Scrivener, Verma & Hendra (2000)) include estimates comparing the
fraction of treatment and control group members with income in broadly dened categories. This approach, which is
essentially a tabular form of histogram plots, is similar in spirit to the approach we take.
2employment history) thought to be particularly at risk for welfare dependence.3 Michalopoulos &
Schwartz (2000) review 20 randomized experiments, concluding that \Although the programs did
not increase [mean] income for most subgroups they also did not decrease [mean] income for most
subgroups" (p. ES-10). Grogger et al. (2002) summarize both nonexperimental and experimental
evidence concerning mean impacts as follows: \the eects of reform do not generally appear to be
concentrated among any particular group of recipients" (p. 231).
The focus in the literature on mean impacts contrasts with the very strong predictions that
labor supply theory makes concerning welfare reform and heterogeneity. Consider, for example,
Figure 1, which shows a stylized budget constraint in income-leisure space before and after Jobs
First (whose characteristics we describe in detail below). Jobs First dramatically increased the
disregard for calculating welfare benets. In the pre-reform AFDC program, benets were reduced
dollar-for-dollar with increased earnings, leading to the horizontal portion of the budget set (which
corresponds to a 100% tax rate).4 Under Jobs First, recipients retain their entire benet payment
(a 0% tax rate) for earnings up to the poverty line.
Labor supply theory makes clear predictions about the impacts of this reform. Women who
would choose to participate in welfare and not work when they face AFDC rules will increase
earnings, provided their wages exceed a threshold level. By contrast, some women who would not
participate under AFDC rules will decrease earnings (to the poverty line or below) to become eligible
for Jobs First. Thus, mean impacts will average together positive and negative treatment eects,
obscuring the full range of eects welfare reform has had. Because recent welfare reforms yield such
clear theoretical predictions regarding heterogeneous treatment eects, they provide ideal terrain
for exploiting QTE methodology. To be sure, quantile treatment eects have been used in previous
experimental evaluations. Examples of their use in evaluating the Job Training and Partnership Act
include Heckman, Smith & Clements (1997) and Firpo (2003), while Friedlander & Robins (1997)
estimate QTE in evaluating employment training in earlier welfare reform experiments. However,
the source of heterogeneous treatment eects in these cases is dicult to identify, since they mostly
3For example, Schoeni & Blank (2000) nd that welfare reforms led to increases (insignicant in the case of TANF)
in mean family income for female dropouts in the CPS. Using similar data, Bennett, Lu & Song (2002) nd that
TANF is associated with reductions in the income-to-needs ratio for poor children who live with a single parent
having less than a high school education.
4As we discuss in section 2.3 below, the eective benet reduction rate under AFDC may be much less punitive
than 100%; what matters here is that it is signicantly more than 0%.
3involve changes to training or job search assistance. Unlike such black-box reforms, theoretical
predictions are clear in the present context.
Our empirical ndings may be summarized with two broad conclusions. First, we nd evidence
of substantial heterogeneity in response to welfare reform. Second, the heterogeneity is broadly
consistent with the predictions of labor supply theory. Contrary to much recent discussion among
policymakers and researchers, under plausible assumptions our results suggest the possibility that
welfare reforms reduced income for a nontrivial fraction of treatment group members, especially
after time limits take eect. An important remaining methodological question is whether the
essential features of our empirical ndings could have been revealed using mean impact analysis
on judiciously chosen subgroups. In the one important case we consider here, we nd striking
evidence that the answer is a resounding no: we nd evidence that intra-group variation in quantile
treatment eects greatly exceeds the inter-group variation in mean impacts.
Using mean impacts|which correspond to assuming risk/inequality neutrality|we nd that
under some circumstances, Jobs First would pass a typical cost-benet test. But when a reform
has heterogeneous eects, mean impacts are not suciently informative for an overall evaluation if
policymakers are inequality-averse. Thus, we also provide an evaluation of Jobs First's eects on
the income distribution using a familiar class of social welfare functions that allow for inequality
aversion. For lower levels of inequality aversion, Jobs First still is found to be benecial on net, but
this conclusion is reversed for relatively high levels of inequality aversion. The evaluation conclusion
depends importantly on how one accounts for Jobs First's administrative costs, and also to some
extent on whether one accounts for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the Jobs First
program and its expected impacts on labor supply, showing that both time limits and disregards
clearly were substantially implemented. In section 3, we present mean treatment eects for com-
parison purposes. We then report quantile treatment eects in 4. In section 5, we provide a social
welfare function analysis to draw welfare conclusions. We conclude in section 6.
42 Jobs First
In this section we summarize Jobs First's programmatic features and their expected impacts, as
well as the public-use experimental data provided by the Manpower Demonstration and Research
Corporation (MDRC), which conducted the ocial Jobs First evaluation. In the next subsection,
we provide an overview of the Jobs First assignment regime and public-use data. In subsections 2.2
and 2.3, we discuss the two most important policy changes in Jobs First: time limits and the
expanded earnings disregard. We then discuss the remaining features of Jobs First in subsection 2.4.
We conclude this section in subsection 2.5 by discussing Jobs First's labor supply implications.
2.1 Jobs First assignment and data
Table 1 summarizes the main features of Jobs First; further details beyond the discussion here
are available in MDRC's nal report on the evaluation [Bloom et al. (2002), henceforth \the nal
report"]. The table also includes a summary of the pre-existing AFDC program for comparison.
The Jobs First waiver contained each of the key elements in PRWORA: time limits, changes to
earnings disregards, work requirements, and nancial sanctions. Under federal law, evaluations
were required of states that implemented waiver programs. The Jobs First evaluation comprised
all cases that were either ongoing or opened in the New Haven and Manchester welfare oces
during the random assignment period, which took place between April 1996 and February 1997.
The evaluation continued through the end of December 2000, after which point no further data
were collected. MDRC's evaluation and public-use samples include data on a total of 4,803 cases.
Of these, 2,396 were assigned to Jobs First and 2,407 to AFDC. Quarterly earnings data and
monthly data on welfare and Food Stamps income are available for the two years preceding program
assignment and for at least 4 years after assignment.5 Demographic data|including information
on educational attainment, age, race and ethnicity, marital status, and work history of the sample
5There are 16 quarterly observations on Connecticut earnings after random assignment for every sample member,
with the exception of 30 people who entered the sample in January or February of 1997. Earnings data come from
Connecticut's Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, so earnings not covered by the UI system are missed; fortunately
the vast majority of employment is covered by the UI system. Data on Food Stamps and welfare payments come
from Connecticut's Eligibility Management System (EMS), which warehouses information about welfare use. To
preserve condentiality, MDRC rounded several key variables before releasing the public-use data (e.g., they rounded
quarterly earnings data to the nearest $100 and AFDC and Food Stamps payments to the nearest $50). For cases
with true amounts between 0 and the lowest reported nonzero value (either $50 or $100), true values are rounded up,
so that there are no false zeroes in the data.
5member|are collected at an interview prior to random assignment.6 During the evaluation, the
rest of Connecticut's caseload was moved to Jobs First; only the control group continued under the
AFDC rules. Table 2 provides a number of summary statistics for the Jobs First population, as
well as for the national AFDC caseload in 1994.7 The Jobs First sample mirrors the characteristics
of the national sample, with exceptions re
ecting the somewhat more disadvantaged recipients in
one of the evaluation sites (New Haven). This is re
ected by somewhat greater fractions of never
married, Hispanic, and less-educated recipients compared to the national caseload average
2.2 The time limit
Jobs First's 21-month time limit is currently the shortest in the U.S. (U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Ways and Means (2000)). About 29% of the treatment group reached the time limit
in the rst 21 months of the evaluation period, and more than half reached the time limit within
four years after random assignment (Bloom et al. (2002)). However, under certain circumstances,
Jobs First caseworkers were empowered to provide both indenite exemptions (as described in
footnote 13) from the time limit and to provide 6-month extensions. According to the nal report,
in the spring of 1998, 26% of the statewide (not just the Jobs First) caseload was exempt from the
time limit. This number rose to 49% by March 2001, though this appears to be the result largely
of progressive exits from the caseload by more able (and time-limited) recipients. Extensions were
granted to a non-exempt woman if her family income was below the applicable maximum benet
payment and she had made a good-faith eort to nd and retain employment.8 If no good-faith
determination was made, then an extension was still possible if \there were circumstances beyond
the recipient's control that prevent[ed] her from working."9
In light of these statistics, it is critical to show that the time limit policy has de facto relevance.
6MDRC also conducted a survey on a subset of the sample about three years after random assignment. These
data, of which we only make slight use below, have been used by others to analyze impacts on other measures of
family and child well-being.
7The estimates for the national caseload are constructed using March 1995 CPS data. The sample includes all
women aged 16{54 who have an own child in the household and whose family was reported to receive positive AFDC
income in the prior calendar year.
8Determination of good faith appears to have been somewhat complicated, often involving \extensive investigation,
including talking with former employers, but sta reported that it often remains unclear why recipients left a job,
reduced hours, and so on."
9Details regarding exemptions and extensions are derived primarily from Chapter 3 of the nal report (which
discusses implementation of the time limit) and from the overview in Chapter 1.
6Figure 2 plots the monthly hazard rate for leaving welfare among women in our data who are still
in their rst welfare participation spell (we discuss sampling issues below). The relatively smooth
series (dashed line) is the hazard rate for the control group, which faced the AFDC rules and, thus,
no time limit. The more jagged series (solid line) is the treatment eect on the hazard rate, which
is computed as the simple dierence in hazards for the Jobs First and AFDC groups. There are
three salient features to this graph. First, there is an enormous spike in the treatment eect on the
hazard at exactly month 22, the rst month when the statutory time limit binds. Second, there are
progressively smaller spikes at months 28, 34, and 46. These are months when 6-month extensions
would expire for women who receive them. There is also a spike at month 39, one month before
a third extension would expire (it is unclear why this spike is a month o). These spikes clearly
imply that the time limit policy was enforced for at least some women, which is a key result. A
third prominent feature of Figure 2 occurs in the rst month following random assignment. The
month-1 control group hazard is very large, showing that a fth of AFDC-assigned women either
leave welfare almost immediately or have their applications declined. For this month, the treatment
eect on the hazard is signicantly negative (around -0.08). Thus, while Jobs First women are still
very likely to leave welfare very soon after assignment, they are signicantly less likely than AFDC
women to do so. Our discussion below of the Jobs First disregard expansion will shed some light
on this nding.
Figure 2 concerns only the rst spell, and hazards can be dicult to interpret after early
months, since the risk set shrinks over time. Consider then Figure 3, which plots monthly welfare
participation rates for women regardless of spell. The smooth series (dashed line) is the welfare
participation rate by month for the AFDC group, while the other series (solid line) is again the
treatment eect, calculated as the simple dierence in the participation rate for the Jobs First
and AFDC groups. This gure has four key features. First, the treatment eect of Jobs First on
welfare participation is actually positive throughout the pre-time limit period. Second, there is a
large drop in the treatment eect at exactly the month when time limits can rst bind. Third, the
treatment eect on welfare participation is negative after this point. Fourth, the gure also suggests
the time limit was not binding for everyone. At month 22, the control group welfare participation
rate was about 50%. If time limits were universally binding, we would have expected the drop in
the treatment eect between months 21 and 22 to be much larger than the gure shows. This is of
7course just another way of saying that exemptions and extensions were provided, as suggested by
Figure 2. In any case, the two gures provide compelling evidence that the time limit policy was
binding for a substantial number of women. This is the important fact for our purposes.
2.3 The expanded earnings disregard
As discussed above, Jobs First's disregard policy is quite simple: every dollar of earnings below
the federal poverty line (FPL) is disregarded for purposes of benet determination. This policy is
very generous by comparison to AFDC's. The statutory AFDC policy was to disregard the rst
$120 of monthly earnings during a woman's rst 12 months on aid, and $90 thereafter. In the
rst four months, benets were reduced by two dollars for every three dollars earned (or otherwise
received), and starting with the fth month, benets were reduced dollar-for-dollar, so that the
long-run statutory implicit tax rate on earnings above the disregard was 100%.10 In practice, there
are two good reasons to think that the eective AFDC tax rate was lower than 100%, even after
the fourth month.
First, a number of work-related expenses (e.g., transportation and child care costs) are supposed
to be disregarded for benet determination purposes.11 Second, it appears from the nal report
that eligibility redetermination for AFDC recipients is done annually, rather than monthly. There
can be a long lag between the month when an AFDC participant earns income and the date when
benets are reduced. In addition, the high 40% subsidy rate in the phase-in region of the EITC
further reduces the eective tax rate faced by AFDC recipients.
To illustrate the dramatic dierence in the treatment of earnings under AFDC and Jobs First,
Figure 4 provides plots of local nonparametric (LOWESS) regression results for the observed re-
lationship between quarterly earnings (the horizontal axis) and quarterly transfer income (dened
10The Jobs First expanded disregard also aects Food Stamp eligibility and benets. Under AFDC rules, eligibility
for AFDC conferred categorical eligibility for Food Stamps. Increasing the earnings disregard will, in general, lead to
an increase in eligibility for welfare and an increase in Food Stamp eligibility. However, losing eligibility for welfare
benets (e.g., through time limits) need not eliminate Food Stamp eligibility, since one could still satisfy the Food
Stamps need standards. In addition, Jobs First Food Stamps rules mirrored cash assistance rules, with Food Stamps
benets determined after disregarding all earnings up to the poverty line.
11Expense deductions lower the observed tax on earnings. But it is less clear whether incentives faced by a woman
who has no work expenses and faces a 100% tax rate are any dierent from those faced by a woman who pays C in
work expenses and then has C dollars disregarded for benet determination. The key question is whether women
derive per se utility from riding the bus to work or from sending children to daycare. If so, then the second kind of
woman is better o than the rst. If not, the presence of disregards simply prevents the net return to work from
being negative.
8as cash welfare plus Food Stamps).12 In these gures, every person-quarter is treated as a distinct
observation. Panel (a) of the gure is for the rst seven post-assignment quarters, before time
limits can bind for anyone. The dotted line is for the AFDC group, while the solid line is for the
Jobs First group. The results show that for quarterly earnings below about $2,500, the slope for
Jobs First members is essentially 0. For AFDC members and for Jobs First members with higher
earnings, the slope implies that benets fall about one dollar for every three earned. The picture
is generally similar (though shifted downward) for quarters 8{16, presented in Panel (c).
One complication in interpreting these gures is that while data on transfer income are available
monthly, earnings data are available only quarterly. One way to get a clearer picture is to consider
only cases that have nonzero transfer income in all 3 months of a given quarter. Panels (b) and (d)
replicate (a) and (c) with this selection criterion. The picture in Panel (b) is remarkable: for
the Jobs First group, the associated benet reduction rate is almost exactly zero across the entire
earnings distribution, while the AFDC group's slope is again approximately -1/3. It seems clear
that the eective tax rate on earnings is substantially below 1 for the AFDC group; this nding,
which has been made in other contexts (e.g., see McKinnish, Sanders & Smith (1999) and Fraker,
Mott & Wolf (1985)) is an interesting result in itself.
For our purposes, the key nding from these gures is that as implemented, Jobs First sig-
nicantly reduced the eective tax rate on earnings. This nding has important implications for
analyzing the labor supply implications of Jobs First, which we do below in Section 2.5.
2.4 Other changes in Jobs First
Jobs First changed other features of welfare in Connecticut including job search assistance, work
requirements, sanctions, more generous child support pass-through, more generous asset limits,
child care and medical insurance expansions, and family caps. These changes are less important
in the current context either because they were relatively minor policy changes, or because they
were not enforced stringently. As will be seen below, these changes all have essentially uniform
predictions for labor supply.
Formal employment assistance under Jobs First was relatively limited. For example, the nal
12The lowess regressions were estimated using a bandwidth parameter that includes 10% of the sample in each
local regression.
9report explains that in the rst two-and-half years of the program, contracted providers supplied
only \roughly two weeks of classroom instruction in job-seeking and job-holding skills, followed by
several more weeks of monitored job search." Moreover, the nal report makes clear that monitoring
of compliance with employment mandates was very weak, partly due to low payments by the state to
contractors meant to track and promote employment. Partly as a consequence, nancial sanctions
for failure to comply with the mandates were rarely levied. The report states that between 8{13%
of Jobs First participants were ever sanctioned, by comparison to 5% of the AFDC-eligible control
group. Unfortunately, the weak monitoring of employment patterns means that no reliable data
on noncompliance are available. Moreover, under some circumstances caseworkers are empowered
to grant Jobs First participants exemptions from work mandates and/or time limits.13 In fact,
over the life of the Jobs First evaluation, 30% of the sample received an exemption in at least one
month. Thus, it is impossible to estimate a reliable noncompliance rate. What is clear is that, at
least during the evaluation period, the Jobs First work requirements could generally be ignored by
program participants with limited risk of sanction.
Jobs First also increased the eective pass-through of child support payments from $50, though
only to $100.14 While Jobs First allowed families to have up to $3,000 in assets and more car equity
than under AFDC, the nal report suggests that women assigned to Jobs First had no more savings
than did women in the control group. The nal report also suggests that the practical dierences
between child care assistance provided by AFDC and Jobs First were limited. With respect to
health insurance, Jobs First provided transitional medical assistance via Medicaid for one year
longer than the AFDC program. However, Connecticut expanded other health insurance policies
during the evaluation period (e.g., Medicaid, SCHIP), so the dierence may not be practically
important. Finally, the partial family cap reduced by about half the incremental benet paid after
the birth of a child conceived while the woman was receiving welfare. However, the incremental
welfare payment was only about $100 to begin with, and the nal report notes that no dierences
13Those circumstances include physical or mental incapacitation, responsibility to care for a disabled relative,
having a child aged younger than 1, and being deemed unemployable due to limited work history and human capital.
Having an exemption means that a woman has no work requirement and that welfare participation does not count
toward the time limit as long as the exemption is in eect.
14Under AFDC, only $50 of each monthly child support payment actually accrued to the mother, with the state
keeping the balance. Under Jobs First, families received all child support collected on their behalf, but only the
rst $100 was disregarded in determining their welfare payment. According to the nal report, Jobs First families
reported having received slightly higher child support payments (by about $30 a month).
10in childbearing were observed across program assignment.
2.5 Expected impacts on earnings, transfers, and income
2.5.1 The disregard
Figure 1 uses stylized budget constraints to illustrate how the expanded disregard aects women's
labor-leisure tradeo. Consider rst women who would locate at the corner of the AFDC budget
set, working 0 hours and receiving the maximum benet. For these women, Jobs First raises the
eective wage from 0 to w, leading to unambiguous increases in employment rates, hours, earnings,
and income. However, transfer income will be unchanged for these women, since they are already
receiving the maximum payment. Of course, not all women will enter the labor market|even with
the more generous disregard, the after-tax wage still may not exceed the woman's reservation level.
Next consider the impact of the Jobs First disregard on women who would ultimately have
hours of labor supply that exceed the AFDC breakeven hours level. Presumably such women are
those whose oered wages are temporarily low, due to frictional unemployment, marital dissolution,
or some other negative shock, but then return to a long run value that makes it optimal to increase
labor supply.15 Such women may be aected by Jobs First's disregard expansion, which adds a
new, much higher kink to the budget constraint where earnings equal the federal poverty line and
benets equal the maximum benet. The usual prediction from such a massive shifting out of
the budget set is that some women will reduce hours below the breakeven level in order to gain
eligibility for transfers. Thus for these high-wage women, we expect both hours and earnings to
fall, while transfers should rise (from zero to the maximum benet). The total impact on income
depends on whether the earnings reduction outweighs the increase in transfer payments.
For a nal group of women, long run wages may be so high that in the absence of a negative
shock they would never participate in either AFDC or Jobs First. For such women, who will tend
to be at the top of the earnings distribution under either welfare system, the treatment eect on
all three of our outcome variables will be zero.
In sum, the predicted eects on the earnings distribution of the disregard expansion are hetero-
15While a static model with a xed oered wage|like that represented by Figure 1|cannot capture such dynam-
ically varying labor supply, it is helpful in guiding our understanding of labor supply choices within periods of time
when the wage is xed.
11geneous: no change at the bottom, increases in the middle, decreases at high earnings, and perhaps
no change at the very top. While these predictions are well-known from earlier discussions of the
role of AFDC benet reduction rates, the Jobs First disregard expansion is larger than any previous
change. And as mentioned in the introduction, mean impacts could mask sizable, opposite-signed
impacts across the distribution.
2.5.2 The time limit
Time limit-induced elimination of welfare eligibility reduces welfare participation and transfer in-
come, and when it occurs it should also lead to increases in labor supply and earnings. Participants
may also \bank" their eligibility by reducing welfare and increasing labor supply even before the
time limit binds, as discussed in Grogger & Michalopoulos (2003). Because earnings are predicted
to rise while transfers are predicted to fall, theoretical predictions concerning total income and time
limits are ambiguous.
2.5.3 Other program changes
Mandatory work activities should also lead to increased earnings and reduced transfers, as discussed
in Mott (2002) and Besley & Coate (1998). Eliminating the option of receiving welfare and
working fewer than a set number of hours will cause recipients who remain on aid to increase
labor supply and earnings. Such work requirements reduce the utility associated with welfare
receipt, so we also expect reduced welfare participation and increases in work. Sanctions act to
nancially penalize welfare participants for not complying with work requirements. Since they
impose new costs on (some) recipients, sanctions should reduce welfare participation and benets,
while increasing work. The net impact on income is uncertain for both work requirements and
sanctions.
3 Mean treatment eects
In this section, we report mean treatment eects. Before proceeding, we must address a com-
plication concerning the quality of random assignment. Table 3 reports our estimates of several
pre-treatment statistics: mean quarterly levels of earnings, cash welfare, and Food Stamps, as well
12as the fraction of pre-treatment quarters in which each of these variables was nonzero.16 This table
shows that before treatment, the Jobs First group had signicantly lower earnings and greater
cash welfare use than did the AFDC group. The nal report notes this but does not provide any
explanation for how this occurred. To deal with this problem, all of MDRC's reported treatment
eects in the nal report are the estimated coecients on a Jobs First treatment dummy in OLS
regressions that include pre-treatment data on earnings, cash welfare, and Food Stamps for the
four quarters preceding random assignment.
While this is a common way of adjusting for pre-treatment dierences, it is now well known
that a more theoretically appropriate approach is to use inverse-propensity score weighting. This is
the approach we take. Brie
y, we estimate the probability that a person is in the treatment group
using predicted values from a logit model in which the treatment dummy is related to the following
variables: quarterly earnings in each of the 8 pre-assignment quarters, quarterly AFDC and Food
Stamps payments in each of the 7 pre-assignment quarters, and dummies indicating whether each
of these 22 variables is nonzero. Denote the estimated propensity score for person i ^ pi and the






1   ^ pi
; (1)
with these weights then used in the standard fashion for all estimators employed below.17;18 In
practice, adjusting for pre-treatment dierences leads to few changes in the estimated mean impacts
and does not change the overall picture.
16For earnings, data are available for the 8 quarters preceding random assignment; for cash welfare and Food
Stamps, data for all observations are available only for the 7 quarters preceding random assignment.
17The literature on propensity scores and mean treatment eects, which is large and growing, began with Rosen-
baum & Rubin (1983). Recent papers focusing on mean treatment eects include Heckman, Ichimura & Todd (1998)
and Hirano, Imbens & Ridder (2003). Firpo (2003) has shown that the same approach corrects for bias in estimation
of quantiles of the counterfactual treated and control distributions, with the simple dierences of adjusted quantiles
then serving as estimates of the quantile treatment eects. The weights given in (1) uncover treatment eects for
the entire population represented by the experimental population. Alternative weights could be used to estimate the
eects of treatment on the treated, but our objective is to estimate the eects of Jobs First under the assumption of
generalizability.
18Two estimation issues arise when using inverse-propensity score weighting. The rst is that theoretical results
generally require nonparametric estimation of the propensity score, while our estimates are parametric. Second,
the variance of estimated treatment eects (mean or quantile) will depend partly on the variance of the estimated
propensity score (and its covariance with treatment and with the unexplained part of the outcome of interest). We
address this issue with the bluntest instrument possible, by simply bootstrapping all of our estimates.
133.1 Mean treatment eects
The rst column of Table 4 reports estimated mean levels among the Jobs First group for several
variables, over the entire 16-quarter post-treatment period. The rst three rows concern average
quarterly values of total income, earnings, and total transfers (where total income is dened as the
sum of earnings and total transfers). The second column provides means for the AFDC group over
the same period, and the third column provides the resulting mean impacts. These results show
that over the four years following random assignment, the impact of Jobs First on average total
income was $135, compared to an estimated baseline quarterly income of $2,612 for the control
group. Thus, the mean impact of Jobs First on income was about 5%. About two-thirds of this
impact is due to an (insignicant) increase in earnings, with the other third due to a signicant
increase in transfers.
The bottom three rows provide means and impacts for binary variables indicating whether the
person had positive levels of income, earnings, and transfers. For example, the value of 0.852 for
\Any income" among the treatment group means that among women assigned to Jobs First, 85.2%
of all person-quarters had a positive value for at least one of UI earnings, cash assistance, or Food
Stamps.19 The results show that the probability of having any earnings was 7 percentage points
greater among the Jobs First group than the control group, an eect of 14 percent relative to the
control group baseline. The probability of having any income or any transfers is essentially identical
across treatment status.
The ndings from the previous section suggest that in the rst 21 months|before time limits
bind for anyone|behavior induced by Jobs First is very dierent from behavior during the nal
27 months. Thus, we separately estimate mean treatment eects for the pre- and post-time limit
periods. The second set of columns includes only the rst 7 quarters of data, while the third set
includes only the last 9 quarters. The results suggest that average earnings increased 7 percent in
the pre-time limit period and (an insignicant) 6 percent in the post-time limit period (the impact
is greater in the later period, but average earnings for the control group are also signicantly
greater). The fraction of Jobs First person-quarters with any earnings also rises in both periods,
19This also means that about 15% of person-quarters had no value in any quarter for any of these variables. This
could mean that 15% of persons never have any income, that everyone has positive income for all but 15% of quarters,
or something in between. We return to this issue in the next subsection.
14by 17 percent in the pre-time limit period and by 12.3% in the post-time limit.
The mean impacts for transfers are starkly dierent in the early and later periods. During
the rst 7 quarters, Jobs First members received $217|or 16.3%|more transfer income than did
control group women. During the later period, Jobs First members received $98|or 12 percent|
less in transfers. The same pattern is clear for the fraction of person-quarters with positive transfers.
The net result of these changes in earnings and transfers is that Jobs First increased mean total
income signicantly|in both economic and statistical terms|in the pre-time limit period. Nearly
three-fourths of this increase is due to increased transfer income, rather than earnings. By contrast,
in the post-time limit period, mean income was virtually identical across treatment status. This is
the result of nearly equal increases in mean income and reductions in mean transfers. Nonetheless,
the post-time limit employment rate (the fraction of quarters with any earnings) is considerably
greater for the Jobs First group. This means that, conditional on working, average earnings are
lower among women caused by Jobs First to work in the last 9 quarters.
4 Quantile treatment eects
We now turn to quantile treatment eects. The rst subsection considers some key methodological
issues necessary for interpreting the quantile treatment eects results. In subsection 4.2, we present
the main results: quantile treatment eects for 98 centiles in graphical form, using all experimental
participants.20 We also investigate whether our results are likely to be driven by migration out
of Connecticut or by withdrawal from both the labor market and welfare following marriage or
increased child support. In subsection 4.3, we discuss whether the heterogeneity we nd could
be satisfactorily uncovered by looking separately at high school dropouts and non-dropouts, a
widely used approach in the literature on welfare reform. In general, the answer is a clear no. We
summarize the QTE ndings in subsection 4.4.
20We computed the QTE at the 99
th quantile but do not include it in the gures below because its variance is
frequently large enough to distort the scale of the gures. The extreme variance at high quantiles for unbounded
distributions is well known; we do not have the same problem at the bottom of the distributions because they are all
bounded below by zero.
154.1 Methodological issues
For the moment, ignore the need to adjust for propensity score dierences. The quantile treatment
eect for quantile q may be estimated very simply as the dierence across treatment status in the
two outcome quantiles. For instance, if we take the sample median for the treatment group and
subtract from it the sample median for the control group, we have the quantile treatment eect at
the .5 quantile. Other quantile treatment eects are estimated analogously.
One important methodological distinction must be made: that between quantile treatment
eects and quantiles of the treatment eect distribution. To understand the distinction, it will
be helpful to brie
y introduce a model of causal eects. Let Ti = 1 if observation i receives
the treatment, and 0 otherwise. Let Yi(t) be i's counterfactual value of the outcome Y if i has
Ti = t. The fundamental evaluation problem is that for any i, at most one element of the pair
(Yi(0);Yi(1)) can ever be observed: we cannot observe someone who is simultaneously treated and
not treated. Evaluation methodology thus focuses on inferences concerning various features of
the joint distribution of (Y (0);Y (1)). In particular, the marginal distributions F0(y) and F1(y)
are always observed, where Ft(y)  Pr[Yi(t)  y] for a randomly drawn i. These are marginal
distributions because the counterfactual control outcome for i can never be observed when Ti = 1,
so that implicitly we have to \integrate out" Y (0) when considering F1, and vice versa. One
can also think of these marginal distributions as the conditional distributions of the observable
outcomes Yi  TiYi(1) + (1   Ti)Yi(0), with the conditioning done on Ti. There is an enormous
literature concerning the model described in the text (which is variously called the Roy Model, the
Quandt Model, and the Rubin Causal Model) and the assumptions under which it is useful. See,
for example, excellent papers by Heckman et al. (1997) or Imbens & Angrist (1994) for further
details.
Quantile treatment eects are features of the marginal distributions F0(y) and F1(y). As usual,
for treatment assignment t, the qth quantile of distribution Ft is dened as yq(t)  inffy : Ft(y)  qg.
The quantile treatment eect for quantile q is then q = yq(1) yq(0); our above example concerning
the QTE for the median involves setting q = 0:5. To account for inverse propensity score weighting,




i ^ !i and then proceed as before.
For observation i, the treatment eect is i  Yi(1)   Yi(0), and the cumulative distribution
of treatment eects may be written as G(d)  Pr[i  d] for randomly chosen i; quantiles of this
16distribution satisfy dq  inffd : G(d)  qg. By contrast to quantile treatment eects, quantiles
of the treatment eects distribution cannot be written as features of the marginal distributions.
Rather, they require more detailed knowledge of the joint distribution. Under some conditions,
the distribution of treatment eects is recoverable. A leading example assumes that the treatment
eect is equal for all observations, in which case G is degenerate (and fully identied by the mean
impact). However, the above discussion of labor supply impacts suggests that is not valid here.
A second example is rank preservation. Under rank preservation, any person whose outcome in
the counterfactual control distribution is the qth quantile will also have an outcome that is the
qth quantile in the counterfactual treated distribution. It then follows that q and q are equal,
and since q is always identied by the dierence of marginals at q, the cumulative distribution of
treatment eects G is also identied by sorting the set of estimated q.
It may be that rank preservation holds for a large portion of the distribution. However, there will
likely be parts of the distribution|such as at the bottom of the distribution where some respond
to the Jobs First incentives and others do not|where rank preservation fails. As a consequence,
quantile treatment eects must be understood as what they are: dierences in the treated and
control distributions, not the treatment eects for identiable women in either distribution.
In the absense of rank preservation, certain important features of the joint distribution of
(Y (0);Y (1)) are still identied. A simple example is the mean treatment eect; if this is the object
of interest, the marginal distributions are just as informative as the joint distribution. Even with
heterogeneous treatment eects, some important features of the joint distribution can be identied,
depending on the estimated quantile treatment eects. For example:21
1. Fix a quantile q. The minimum treatment eect q for all q  q is no larger than
the smallest quantile treatment eect q for q  q. Thus if any QTE is negative,
at least one treatment eect is also negative.
2. The logical inversion also holds. Fix a quantile q. Then supGf : control group rank is q 
qg  supfq : q  qg. Thus if any QTE is positive, at least one treatment eect
is also positive.
21For an illuminating discussion concerning the distinction between the distribution of treatment eects and quantile
treatment eects, see Heckman et al. (1997). Some items in the list below are discussed there, while others are not
but can be shown easily.
173. The variance of the distribution of treatment eects is at least as great as the
variance of the quantile treatment eects.
4. If subgroups are dened with respect to characteristics that are either permanent
or xed over the period of study, then the above results hold within subgroup,
which may yield further information (e.g., the maximum QTE may be greater in
a subgroup than in the pooled sample).
These examples show that quantile treatment eects do provide considerable information about
treatment eect heterogeneity. We have seen that, other things equal, expanded disregards should
leave earnings unchanged for women with suciently low oered wages, increase earnings as we
move up the wage distribution, and reduce earnings (due to entry eects) at the top of the wage
distribution. Moreover, theory suggests that, provided women remain in Connecticut and do not
get married, no element of Jobs First should cause anyone to reduce earnings from a positive level
to zero.22 This argument suggests that quantile treatment eects may be fruitfully used in tandem
with labor supply theory to understand the eects of Jobs First. Lastly, we note that classical social
welfare function analysis, as we discuss in section 5, requires only the marginal, xed-treatment
distributions.
The nature of Jobs First, and the results in section 2, suggest that in practice Jobs First is best
thought of as two overlapping programs: one that increases the generosity of the welfare system for
women who combine welfare and work, and a second that greatly restricts this generosity for women
who initially stay on welfare and demonstrate nontrivial earnings capacity. This Jekyll-and-Hyde
program design raises methodological questions in using nonlinear estimators, including quantile
treatment eects. It seems clear that looking separately at the pre- and post-time limit periods
is important. But it is less clear how to do this. One approach is to estimate quantile treatment
eects for outcomes averaged over the relevant periods; for example, average quarterly earnings in
the seven pre-time limit quarters. A second approach is to use the person-quarter as the unit of
22Welfare and unemployment insurance programs can be thought of as subsidizing job search, and expansions in
their generosity are typically thought to raise reservation wages for working. This sort of eect would delay the onset
of positive earnings, causing some treated women to have zero earnings in some months, when their counterfactual
earnings given AFDC assignment would have been positive. However, Jobs First does not actually subsidize o-the-
job search, since the expanded disregard aects disposable income only for women who have positive earnings. If
anything, the expanded disregard (together with the time limit) should speed up exit from unemployment, which was
certainly Connecticut's intention.
18analysis.
There are arguments for each of these approaches. In general, one would like the unit of
analysis to be the longest period through which consumption smoothing is possible. Thus, if
women in the sample are able to smooth consumption across quarters over a two-year period, then
averaged outcomes before and after time limits may be an appropriate measure of Jobs First's
eects. However, it is easy to imagine that consumption smoothing will be dicult for welfare
recipients: both the eligibility requirement of low assets and the fact that human capital for welfare
recipients is typically low suggest that liquidity constraints likely are binding. An alternative
argument for using average within-period outcomes is that it does not complicate standard error
estimation, whereas using the person-quarter as the unit of analysis induces dependence in an
otherwise-iid context. However, using inverse propensity score weighting complicates the estimation
of standard errors anyway, a problem that we address by bootstrapping. Rather than take a stand
on this issue, we simply report results computed each way; our results are qualitatively robust to
these two approaches.
4.2 QTE results for the full sample
4.2.1 Earnings
Figure 5 introduces the QTE estimator. The top panel plots centiles of the earnings distribution
using person-quarter observations among Jobs First and AFDC women in the rst seven quarters
following implementation of Jobs First (before time limits bind). The vertical dierence between
these lines at a given decile is an estimate of the reform's treatment eect on earnings at that
quantile. We plot these QTEs in the bottom panel of Figure 5. For comparison purposes, the mean
treatment eect is plotted as a horizontal (dashed) line, and the 0-line is provided for reference.
Dotted lines represent 90% condence intervals calculated using the empirical standard deviation
of 250 bootstrap replications of the quantile treatment eects.23 The variation in the impact across
the quantiles of the distributions is unmistakably signicant, both statistically and substantively.
This gure shows that for quarterly earnings in the pre-time limit period, the quantile treatment
23We use non-overlapping block bootstrap, with each person as a single block. This removes any within-person
dependence in the estimates using the person-quarter as the unit of observation. The condence intervals are based
on a two-tailed test.
19eect is identically zero for nearly half of all person-quarters. This result occurs because quarterly
earnings are identically 0 for 48% of the pre-time limit treatment group person-quarters and 55%
of the control group person-quarters. For quantiles 49{82, treatment group earnings are greater
than control group earnings. Between quantiles 83{87, earnings are again equal (though non-zero).
Finally, for quantiles 88{98, control group earnings exceed treatment group earnings. These results
are exactly what basic labor supply theory, discussed above, predicts. It is useful to note that
the range of the point estimates for the QTE is quite large: about [-$250 , $600], compared to
a mean treatment eect of $93 with an estimated standard error of $57. As we noted above, no
policy change in Jobs First should cause women to lower earnings from a positive amount to zero.
Thus for all women who are assigned to Jobs First and have zero earnings, the treatment eect (as
opposed to the QTE) is known to be zero.
For the remainder of the paper, we will present results like the bottom panel of Figure 5{
plotting QTE estimates for each centile of the earnings, transfer, and total income distributions.
The main results are reported in Figures6{8. In each gure, the graphs on the left hand side use
the person-quarter as the unit of analysis, while those on the right-hand side use within-person
quarterly averages. The top graphs are for the rst 7 quarters, the middle ones for the last 9, and
the bottom ones for all 16 quarters.24 For comparison, Appendix gures 1{3 provide the inverse
cdfs analogous to the top panel of Figure 5.
For the post-time limit period, earnings eects are broadly similar to those just discussed,
though with a somewhat wider range. Considering all observations over the entire 16-quarter
period also yields similar results.
The three gures using averaged quarterly earnings are all considerably smoother than those
using person-quarters as the unit of analysis, as we expect when there is any within-person, over-
time variation in earnings. Using averaged outcomes also reduces the range of estimated quantile
treatment eects, especially at the top. However, this range is still very large relative to the mean
treatment eects and their standard errors.
Finding that earnings quantile treatment eects are negative at higher quantiles suggests a
program-entry (or more likely non-exit) response among women who would have had high earnings
24Thus, for the rst seven quarters, quantile treatment eects are calculated using 74;803 = 33;621 observations.
For the last nine quarters, there are (9  4;803)   30 = 43;207 observations.
20and stayed o welfare were they subject to AFDC rules. Thus, the nding is consistent with the
prediction that Jobs First's generous disregard will cause large negative income eects on hours
worked for high-wage women. Indeed, according to data from the three-year survey discussed in
the nal report, hours worked in the month of the survey were lower among high-earnings Jobs
First women than among high-earnings AFDC women.
In our view, the reduction in earnings at the top of the distribution caused by Jobs First is most
likely due to the disregard expansion and its eligibility-inducing negative income eects. However,
time limits and some of the other features of Jobs First will tend to lower the wage at which women
are willing to exit welfare. Such accelerated search provides an alternative explanation fo the
negative QTE results at higher quantiles of the earnings distribution. In fact, data from the three-
year follow-up survey do suggest that employed Jobs First women have lower wages throughout
much of the top half of the wage distribution.
But if lower reservation wages for exiting welfare were the only cause of reduced earnings at
the top, then welfare participation rates at higher earnings levels should be lower among Jobs
First than among AFDC women. To test this hypothesis, we rst sort average earnings into
10 bins corresponding to deciles of the control group earnings distribution. We then calculate
person-specic welfare participation rates and compare then across treatment status. If the search
explanation is correct, then welfare participation rates should be lower among high-earnings Jobs
First women; if the eligibility eect is correct, the opposite is true. In the pre-time limit period, we
nd that welfare participation rates are signicantly greater among Jobs First women with earnings
at least equal to the control group median. Moreover, this dierence increases as we move to higher
earnings bins. For example, for the three highest control group deciles, welfare participation rates
are 12{15 percentage points greater in the Jobs First group. In the post-time limit period, this
dierence at higher earnings largely disappears. We would expect this result, since women who are
induced to stay on Jobs First because of the generous disregard will generally have high earnings
and thus be unlikely to get extensions. We thus conclude that in the pre-time limit period, negative
quantile treatment eects at higher quantiles are likely due to disregard-induced negative income
eects. In the post-time limit period, reduced work-no-welfare reservation wages are a more likely
explanation.
214.2.2 Transfers
Figure 7 presents results for transfer income, dened as the sum of cash payments and the face value
of Food Stamps. The most notable feature of these results is the radical dierence in the treatment
eects of Jobs First across the pre- and post-time limit period. Consider rst the person-quarter
results in the program's rst seven quarters. The QTE is identically 0 for the bottom 20 quantiles,
re
ecting the fact that for 20% of person-quarters, both the treatment and control group have zero
transfer income. For all person-quarter quantiles (except for two) above the 20th, transfer income
in the pre-time limit period is greater among Jobs First women than among AFDC women. This
nding greatly extends the result for mean treatment eects presented in section 3. Moreover,
the range of quantile treatment eects in this period is very large, with the largest QTE reaching
$700. As a basis of comparison, this is nearly three times the upper limit of the 90% condence
interval around the mean eect of $217; it is also nearly a third of the maximum quarterly value
of Connecticut's combined AFDC-Food Stamps payment for a family of three. By comparison to
AFDC, Jobs First in the pre-time limit period clearly is associated with a substantial upward shift
of the transfer income inverse cdf.
The person-quarter graph for the post-time limits period is much dierent. The graph shows
that for the lowest 48 quantiles, the Jobs First and AFDC transfer distributions are equal, with both
showing zero transfer income at all these quantiles. However, at essentially all quantiles between
49{96, the Jobs First group receives less transfer income. The size of the reductions in transfer
income can be quite large: the largest quarterly reduction is $550, and the reduction is at least $300
for all quantiles from 64{76. By stark contrast to the pre-time limit period, these results suggest
that Jobs First in the post-time limit period is associated with a substantial downward shift of the
transfer income inverse cdf. And again, these ndings tell a much richer story than does the mean
treatment eect of -$98, together with its standard error of $25.
Putting together the pre- and post-time limit periods in the bottom graph shows that the full,
16-quarter eects of Jobs First on the transfer income distribution are relatively limited. Aside
from the $250 QTE at the 99th quantile, the largest QTE is only $150. The basic picture from the
person-quarter approach is that, over the full period, the large positive quantile treatment eects
in the pre-time limit period and the large negative eects in the post-time limit period more or less
cancel each other out.
22Using averaged quarterly transfers yields a generally similar story. As with earnings, the cross-
quarter, within-person averaging reduces the variability of quantile treatment eects. For the pre-
and post-time limit periods, averaging also reduces the range of the quantile treatment eects, but
without changing the basic qualitative results. For the overall time period, however, results using
averaging and person-quarter units appear somewhat dierent. First, the range of eects is actually
greater using the averaged transfers. Second, the treatment eects on the distribution of average
transfer income are clearly positive at lower quantiles and negative at higher quantiles.
4.2.3 Total income
We can now discuss the eects of Jobs First on total income. Total income as we observe it is the
sum of earnings and transfers. Since a given increase in total income could be driven by either
large reductions in transfers together with increases in earnings, or no change in transfers together
with smaller increases in earnings, there need not be any particular relationship between quantile
treatment eects for total income and for its components. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider quantile
treatment eects for total income, which we present in Figure 8.
Person-quarter results for the pre-time limit period again suggest a large degree of heterogeneity
in quantile treatment eects. Quantile treatment eects range from 0 for the bottom 9 quantiles|
where total income from administratively measurable sources is 0|to $800 at the top of the range.
The mean treatment eect for this period is $296, with a standard error of $47, so again, the range
of quantile treatment eects is much greater than the range provided by a condence interval for
the mean treatment eect. For the post-time limit period, the mean treatment eect of $10 is
trivial, but the quantile treatment eect results clearly show that it would be wrong to think Jobs
First has no impact for the entire distribution. Quantile treatment eects for total income are
zero for the rst 18 quantiles and are actually negative for about 25 quantiles. For some of these
quantiles the reduction in quarterly total income is as large as $300|the magnitude of the mean
treatment eect in the pre-time limit period.
Putting together the two periods, the person-quarter quantile treatment eects on total income
are presented in the bottom-left graph of Figure 8. The graph shows that for the bottom 14
quantiles, both the Jobs First and AFDC distributions have 0 total income. The quantile treatment
eects remain non-positive, and generally negative, until quantile 37, though the magnitudes of the
23negative quantile treatment eects is not very large. Quantile treatment eects are positive, and
in some cases relatively large, for quantiles 41{98. Compared to the mean treatment eect of $135
(standard error=54), this is again quite a large range. As with earnings and transfers, results
using averaged quarterly total income as the dependent variable yield the same basic qualitative
conclusions regarding Jobs First's impact.
Results for total income thus suggest that compared to AFDC, Jobs First exhibits reductions or
no eects on income at lower quantiles, with quantile treatment eects at higher quantiles clearly
being positive. This nding drives much of the analysis in the next section.
4.2.4 Robustness checks related to exits from administrative data
One concern in interpreting the above QTE results involves women who have zero total income in
some quarters. For these women to survive, they must have some way to nance consumption other
than UI-covered Connecticut earnings, cash assistance through either Jobs First or Connecticut's
AFDC program, and Food Stamps. Such women could have some other source of earnings (UI-
noncovered or under-the-table), they could have support (cash or in-kind) from family members or
absent non-custodial parents, or they could have moved out of Connecticut. A substantial amount
of discussion in the nal report (mostly using the three-year followup survey) suggests that neither
marriage nor migration rates were systematically aected by welfare policies and that child support
payments were only slightly impacted. That is not enough for our purposes, however, because it is
always possible (for example) that high-earnings women were systematically caused by Jobs First
to stay in Connecticut, while low-earnings women systematically moved out. In this situation, the
overall migration rate would be unaected, but the zeroes in our total income data would be driven
partly by missing data.
To deal with this issue, we take the following conservative approach. For each woman with zero
total income in some quarter, we nd the last chronological quarter in which she had nonzero total
income. We then act as if she moved out of the state at the beginning of that quarter, excluding all
subsequent quarters (all of which have zero earnings, transfers, and total income) for that woman
from the analysis. When we do this, slightly more than a fth of the sample of person-quarters is
dropped. While this is a nontrivial share, there is virtually no variation across treatment status
in the overall probability of \exiting" the administrative data. Furthermore, at each quarter in
24the followup period, there are no statistically signicant dierences in the probability of exiting
the sample between the treatment and control group.25 Nonetheless, we recalculated the quantile
treatment eects excluding our synthetic \movers". Not surprisingly, the results estimated on this
sample of nonmovers are qualitatively virtually identical to the gures presented above.
To further explore the robustness of our results to potential movers, we also re-calculated our
estimates for the specications using averaged outcomes as the dependent variables. To do this, we
drop all women who ever \move" (rather than just dropping quarterly post-\move" observations,
as just described). Again, this alteration makes no noticeable dierence in our results.
4.3 Quantile treatment eects by subgroup
So far, we have included all women for whom we have usable data. One might argue that this stacks
the deck in favor of nding signicant treatment eect heterogeneity. We think the heterogeneity
demonstrated above would still be important in this case. But it is interesting to examine whether
mean treatment eects together with judicious choice of observable subgroups would allow us to
capture most or all of the heterogeneity demonstrated above. To examine this question, we follow
a common approach in the welfare reform literature, considering separately high school dropouts
and women with at least a high school diploma.26 Non-dropouts are often used as a comparison
group: given non-dropouts' lower welfare participation rates, reforms are often thought to aect
them less than dropouts. We note that to be part of the experiment, all women in our sample had
to apply for welfare, so this argument is less clearcut than is typically the case. Nonetheless, this
is a logical way to consider the subgroups question.27
The top row of Figure 9 provides graphs of quantile treatment eects in quarters 1{7 (person-
25The highest absolute-value t-statistic is 1.42 in a regression of indicators for \moving out" each quarter on
treatment status.
26Dropout status is collected at a baseline intake survey around the time of random assignment. This information
is then provided by MDRC in the same public-use le as the administrative records. This variable is missing for a
small number of observations, which we exclude from the subgroup analysis.
27Various parts of the nal report (especially Appendix I) contain analyses of a wide array of subgroups. However,
the focus is on groups labeled \most disadvantaged" and \least disadvantaged". The most disadvantaged are those
who \had received cash assistance for at least 22 of the 24 months prior to random assignment, had not worked in
the year prior to random assignment, and did not have a high school diploma or GED certicate" (see footnote 12 on
page 22 of the nal report). The least disadvantaged are those for whom none of these three conditions hold. While
the information on prior employment and welfare use is valuable and would probably be used by researchers when
available, most public-use datasets (e.g., the CPS) do not have such detailed data. For comparability, we use only
pre-treatment dropout status to cut the data. Analysis using the MDRC categorizations shows that this choice does
not aect the conclusion we reach here.
25quarter as unit of analysis) among dropouts for each of earnings, transfers, and total income. The
bottom row provides analogous graphs for nondropouts. Figure 10 presents a similar collection of
graphs for the last nine quarters after treatment.
We oer several observations regarding these results. First, the dierences in mean treatment
eects across dropout status are basically trivial, never exceeding $100 per quarter. Second, the
heterogeneity in quantile treatment eects within dropout status appears to be no less than the
heterogeneity when we pool observations. The proles of the graphed quantile treatment eects are
sometimes shifted in one direction or another, but the basic fact of heterogeneity is pervasive, and
the basic shapes of the quantile treatment eects are similar. We note that the apparent compression
of the earnings and total income graphs among dropouts is just an artifact of scale distortion due
to the high variance in QTE estimates for dropouts; if we plot only the point estimates, the shapes
are very similar.28 These graphs provide abundant evidence that if we used the most common
mean impacts-based subgroup approach to dealing with potential treatment eect heterogeneity,
we would miss virtually the entire story.29 The conclusion that there is little heterogeneity in
treatment eects has in fact been drawn in the mean impacts literature, as shown by this quote
from Grogger et al. (2002, p. 231) summarizing both nonexperimental and experimental evidence:
\the eects of reform do not generally appear to be concentrated among any particular group of
recipients."
4.4 Summary of QTE results
The results presented in this section establish several clear conclusions. First, mean treatment
eects miss a lot: estimated quantile treatment eects show a great deal of heterogeneity. Second,
the results for earnings are clearly consistent with predictions from labor supply theory that eects
at the bottom should be zero or positive, while eects at the top should be negative. It is important
that the true treatment eect on earnings appears to be zero for a large fraction of person-quarters.
28We also computed estimates using averaged values of the outcomes. As above, the prole of these estimated
quantile treatment eects was smoother, but the basic story is entirely unchanged.
29One interesting dierence in the earnings quantile treatment eects across dropout status is that dropouts do not
exhibit negative earnings impacts for higher quantiles. This is likely due to the fact that the upper quantiles of the
dropout quarterly earnings distribution occur at very low levels. For example, among Jobs First women, the rst 7
quarters, the 95th quantile is just $3,700, barely the federal poverty line for a family of three. By contrast, the 95th
quantile among nondropouts is $5,300, well above the point where Jobs First eligibility would be lost for a family of
three. This suggests that the disregard expansion's income eect is less likely to aect dropouts than non-dropouts.
26Third, the eects of Jobs First are very dierent in the pre- and post-time limit period, especially
with respect to the transfers distribution.
Fourth, it is not unreasonable to believe that Jobs First led to substantial increases in income
for a large group of women. On the other hand, it had at best no impact, and perhaps a negative
one, on another sizable group of women. This nding is at odds with that of Schoeni & Blank
(2003 (Papers and Proceedings)), discussed in our introduction. Moreover, we nd that most of
the shift in the income distribution occurs at above-median quantiles.
Fifth, our results are unaected by dropping observations from women who may have moved
out of state or otherwise left the public assistance system while having no earnings (e.g., gotten
married). Sixth, focusing on dierences in mean treatment eects between dropouts and non-
dropouts|perhaps the most common comparison-group approach|is virtually useless in uncover-
ing the treatment eect heterogeneity we demonstrate.
5 Assessing Jobs First using alternative social welfare functions
Perhaps the most common approach taken to evaluating whether programs like Jobs First are
worthwhile overall is mean cost-benet analysis. For example, in the nal report, MDRC computes
average income gains for Jobs First women relative to AFDC women, and then compares these
gains to the additional costs to the government of running Jobs First rather than AFDC. But since
Jobs First's treatment eects vary considerably, mean cost-benet analysis may miss important
distributional eects.
To evaluate the program, we take a classical social welfare function approach. Ignoring ex-
perimental assignment for the moment, let person i's transfer income in quarter t be given by
it, and let earnings be wit. Then, accounting for payroll taxes of 7.65% (and ignoring other
taxes), i's disposable income in t is yit  it + 0:9235wit.30 The standard approach is to dene
social welfare over yit. However, moving women from welfare to work has been an explicit goal of
virtually every welfare reform program undertaken in the last decade. To allow for this evident
preference among policymakers for earnings rather than transfer income, we dene social welfare
30We do not observe family size in the public-use data, which makes it more dicult to impute state and federal
income taxes. MDRC includes an imputed EITC, which we do use below. Note that payroll taxes are thus treated
as if their incidence is entirely on workers and valued at zero over the period of study.
27over y
it()  0:01 + yit + wit, so that  measures the additional weight placed on a dollar of
earnings compared to a dollar of transfer income. We add 0.01 because in cases with a high degree
of inequality aversion, the social welfare function is unboundedly negative if anyone has zero con-
sumption. Letting z = (;w) be the observed vector of disposable income for all N persons over















We then compute SJ = S(z;;jJ) and SA = S(z;;jA), where J and A respectively denote Jobs
First and AFDC assignment. To evaluate Jobs First in terms of the social welfare function, we
simply observe the sign of S  SJ SA. The parameter  is the standard coecient of relative risk
aversion. This functional form nicely nests the mean impacts case, which occurs when  = 0. For
now, we ignore administrative and operating costs of Jobs First, but we incorporate them below.
An advantage of this social welfare function approach is that it requires only the observed data
on the marginal distributions. In other words, when a social welfare function is the evaluation
criterion, \names don't matter": two policies that increase the social welfare function by 100 are
viewed equally, even if one reduces utility for all but one person (whose utility rises signicantly)
and the other raises everyone's utility equally. This approach is not new (e.g., see Atkinson (1970))
and has recently been advocated by Abadie, Angrist & Imbens (2002). An alternative view is that
distributions of treatment eects (or some functionals of them) are themselves necessary inputs to
the evaluation of programs. For example, Heckman et al. (1997, p. 488) write that \Appeal to a
mythical social welfare function begs fundamental questions of political economy. The distribution
of the benets (and costs) from a programme determines the support for a programme if voters are
self-interested or if they are altruistic." According to this view, \names matter".31 In general, we
agree that the distribution of treatment eects will be important for determining political viability
31A third approach is that taken by Dehejia (Forthcoming), who treats program evaluation as a decision-theoretic
problem. He uses data from the Alameda County portion of California's job search- and training-based GAIN
experiment, conducted in the late 1980s, to assess the role of heterogeneity in guiding optimal program assignment in
the post-evaluation period. This approach solves the fundamental evaluation problem described above by assuming it
away, i.e., by assuming that the functional form of the joint distribution (Y (0);Y (1)) can be estimated parametrically.
Angrist & Dehejia (2001) also allow for individual and social welfare considerations in the presence of risk and
inequality aversion.
28of a reform. But in the present context, we do not think this shortcoming is serious, since members
of the welfare population appear to have little political clout, either individually or as a group.
One must still decide whether the results of our evaluation can be generalized to some steady
state, or whether they are conned to the particular population and time period represented here.
The experimental sample was drawn in such a way as to represent the New Haven and Manchester
welfare populations during the period between April 1996 and February 1997. The fact that both
existing recipients and new applicants are included is helpful, since it means that our sample
represents the true population over the intake period.
On the other hand, the underlying process generating new potential welfare recipients (due
to job losses, divorces, and out-of-wedlock births) and welfare exits (due to new job matches,
marriages, and aging-out of children) may not be dynamically stable. In this case, our results will
not generally be informative about states of the world with dierent in- and out-
ow rates. In
addition, generalizability requires that there be no state dependence in welfare use. Our results
show that Jobs First clearly changes the dynamic prole of welfare use, and true state dependence
would interact with these changes. Thus the observed short-run program dynamics would not
accurately represent steady-state behavior.32 Lastly, we would need to assume that a four-year
horizon is sucient to evaluate a program. If (as is the case) some women spend many years on
welfare, and if those women are an important part of the welfare population, then a four-year
demonstration simply does not provide support for conclusions regarding the long-run eects of the
program.
Unfortunately, there is not much we can do about any of these concerns, since the demonstration
program is over. It is worth noting, however, that the same problem besets traditional mean-
impact cost-benet analysis: if dynamics are changed importantly by the reform, then no short-run
evaluation will be fully informative about steady-state program eects. This weakness is related
to experiments, not to our approach to using their data.33 With all these caveats in mind, we
believe the social welfare function exercise is worth doing. As above, we must also decide whether
to use person-quarters as the unit of analysis or to use averaged values, a choice that boils down
32For a discussion of the econometric problems endemic to studies of welfare use and state dependence, see Chay,
Hoynes & Hyslop (1999). These authors nd signicant evidence of true state dependence using administrative data
from California.
33For an excellent discussion of the pros and cons of social experiments, see Heckman & Smith (1995).
29to one's beliefs concerning the feasibility of consumption smoothing. Under either approach, if
we make the assumptions sucient to regard our results as representing a steady-state, we are
entitled to argue that a given person in our sample represents all observably and unobservably
similar people in a steady state, so our population represents the relevant steady-state population.
If we think no consumption smoothing is possible, we can simply treat each person-quarter as
a separate observation. Dierent quarters for a given person would then appropriately represent
steady-state people of dierent cohorts. On the other hand, if we think that full consumption
smoothing is possible, it would be more appropriate to use average income over the entire post-
assignment period, since long run averages better represent the consumption resources available.
As above, we handle this issue by reporting results calculated each way.34
We begin in Table 5 by focusing on person-quarters as the unit of analysis. The rst row reports
SA and S = SJ   SA under the assumption that  = 0, so that a dollar of transfer income has
the same social value as a dollar of earnings. As noted,  = 0 yields the simple mean-impact
cost-benet analysis.35 The rst column shows that average quarterly income for the AFDC group
is just under $2,493, with the treatment eect being $127. For this social welfare function, Jobs
First passes the cost-benet test. As we move to the right in the rst row of this table,  increases,
and the social welfare function places greater weight on lower-income women. Thus in percentage
terms, the program gain with  = 1=2 (2.0, compared to a control group baseline of 87.8) is less
than half that for the means case. When we get to log utilities, the program eect is actually
slightly (though not signicantly) negative. Lastly, when  reaches 2, Jobs First is associated with
a statistically signicant decline in social welfare of between 3{4 percent.
The second row of Table 5 increases  from 0 to 0.9235. Thus a dollar of after-payroll tax
earnings is double-weighted in this specication. Since average earnings increase slightly with Jobs
First, the  = 0 treatment eect increases. Moreover, we know that except for very high quantiles,
where earnings fell, Jobs First either didn't aect the earnings distribution or raised it; since higher
quantiles get relatively less weight when  > 0, the treatment eect rises relative to the  = 0 case
34There is a large literature on consumption smoothing in the general population. With respect to people for whom
transfer payments are an important source of income, Gruber (2000) nds little crowd-out of AFDC payments to
women who transition into divorce, while Stephens (n.d.) nds that daily consumption is signicantly sensitive to
receipt of Social Security payments. Both of these ndings suggest that full consumption smoothing is too strong an
assumption.
35Note that our use of inverse propensity score weights means our results are not directly comparable to those in
the nal report. Also, unlike MDRC, we ignore discounting and in
ation-adjustment.
30for  2 f1=2;1g and is unaected for  = 2.
Up to this point, we have ignored the issue of Jobs First's operational costs. Over the full ve-
year study period, Jobs First actually cost $2,252 per person more than AFDC to administer. This
added cost was due to additional expenditures on case management, education and training, other
employment-related and post-time limit support services, child care, and transportation services.
Moreover, as Table 4 shows, quarterly transfer payments were greater under Jobs First than AFDC,
by $42. How to account for these dierences in administrative and operating costs is somewhat
tricky. It might be tempting to simply subtract some multiple of the per-quarter added costs from
SJ, but it is unclear how to do this when we are changing the curvature of the social welfare function
across parameterizations. Instead, we observe that the government could have retained AFDC and
simply made lump-sum transfers to all women in the study equal to 2252=20 + 42 = 154:60 per
quarter. We thus add this amount to each AFDC-group woman's transfer income in each quarter,
noting that this provides a lower-bound on the impact of accounting for dierential costs (since
there might be other better ways to spend the money).
The third and fourth rows of Table 5, in Panel B, report results that account for dierences in
costs. Jobs First is now associated with signicant social welfare reductions in all but the mean-
impacts case in which earnings are double-weighted. In the inequality-averse cases with  2 f1;2g,
the reduction in social welfare is quite large in relative terms. For the  = 2 case, it is clear that this
is so because the $154.60 transfer for AFDC group women with zero income|but not for similarly
situated Jobs First women|dominates the rest of the distribution. But even for the  = 1=2 case,
accounting for costs makes a clear dierence.
Table 6 replicates this analysis using values of earnings and transfers that have been averaged
over the entire 16-quarter period. These results are notable in two ways. First, with the exception
of the mean-impacts cases, the baseline levels of the social welfare function are larger than the
person-quarter baselines, though not always enormously so.36 For instance, when  = 1=2,  = 0,
and we ignore costs, baseline social welfare is 87.8 using person-quarters but 93.9 using averaged
income values. Thus, the social value of full consumption smoothing in this case is 6.9% of social
36The mean-impacts cases dier slightly because a small number of women have no income data for the 16th
quarter after assignment (because these women entered the experiment at the very end of the intake period and were
followed for only 15 quarters). These women wind up being dropped from the averaged specications, whereas only
their Q16 data are dropped from the person-quarter specications.
31welfare when no smoothing is possible. As we increase  and social welfare becomes more sensitive
to consumption 
uctuations, the distinction between using person-quarters and averaged values
becomes more important. For the  = 0,  = 2 case, control group baseline social welfare is 94%
greater with full smoothing.
Availability of full smoothing also has a large eect on the evaluation of Jobs First. When full
smoothing is done and costs are ignored, Jobs First has a small positive eect on social welfare
even with  = 1, and essentially no impact when  = 2. When Jobs First costs are redistributed as
a lump sum to AFDC group members, we see negative eects of Jobs First only in all but the cases
that double-weight earnings and have  2 f0;1=2g. We note that these eects are considerably
smaller than in the person-quarter analysis, though they are still statistically signicant.
These results suggest that Jobs First-driven changes in income variability were substantial, at
least for women with lower average incomes. To investigate this question, we created the coecient
of variation in total income over the full 16-quarter period for each woman in the sample. We
then computed (inverse propensity score-weighted) dierences in this variable across treatment
status. For women in the Jobs First group, the mean coecient of variation was 0.024 greater
than the AFDC group's mean of 0.673, a dierence that was not statistically signicant. However,
this apparent similarity masks considerable heterogeneity across the sample. For AFDC women
with total, four-year income below the AFDC group's median of $40,000, the baseline coecient
of variation was 0.937; for Jobs First women with four-year income below $40,000, the coecient
of variation was 0.119 greater than this (with a standard error of 0.038). Among women with
income above the AFDC group's median, the coecient of variation was only 0.385, with virtually
no dierence by treatment group. These facts show that one thing Jobs First did do was greatly
increase dynamic income variability in the lower half of the income distribution. This eect will
clearly exacerbate the role of any liquidity constraints.
A natural remaining question is how the availability of the EITC aects our results. MDRC's
public-use le includes a variable measuring imputed EITC takeup and amounts. Takeup is a
serious issue, since receiving the EITC requires ling a tax return. Indeed, MDRC's three-year
survey found that among women with annual earnings below $5,000, fewer than 60% reported
ling a tax return for the previous year. These women are all in the phase-in range, so all would
be entitled to a refundable credit. By contrast, 93.5% of women with earnings above $15,000
32led, and most of these women would be in the phase-out range. For a mean-impact analysis,
estimating takeup and the amount of the credit may not be too worrisome. However, things are
more complicated with a nonlinear social welfare function, given the EITC's own highly non-linear
structure. Nonetheless, we generated a version of Table 5 using this imputed EITC variable, and
the results are qualitatively very similar to those reported here.
6 Conclusion
This paper yields several important ndings. First, mean impacts miss a great deal of treatment
eect heterogeneity. Our estimated quantile treatment eects demonstrate that systematic hetero-
geneity is the rule, not the exception, in evaluating the eects of Jobs First. Moreover, comparing
mean impacts for dropouts and nondropouts|a reasonable approach|fails entirely to uncover this
heterogeneity. In fact, the within-group treatment eect heterogeneity is as great as the hetero-
geneity using the pooled sample.
Second, the results are consistent with|and in some cases likely conrm|basic predictions of
labor supply theory concerning the expanded Jobs First disregard. Third, Jobs First's impact on
transfer income appears to depend critically on whether time limits have yet taken eect. Before
time limits, Jobs First leads to considerable increases in transfer income; afterward, it leads to
considerable decreases. Fourth, for the bottom 40{50% of the income distribution (not necessarily
of particular people located there), Jobs First either has no impact on total income or reduces
it. At higher quantiles, this result is reversed. Using several parameterizations of a social welfare
function, we nd that Jobs First may be benecial or not, depending on inequality aversion and
accounting for Jobs First's greater administrative and operating costs.
Taken as a whole, these ndings paint a mixed picture of Jobs First. On the one hand, it does
not appear to have caused mass immiseration as some critics of recent welfare reforms would have
predicted.37 Moreover, there is clear evidence of sizable|compared to typical mean impacts|
earnings gains for at least some women. On the other hand, the Jobs First experience shows that
the law of unintended consequences has not been repealed. When sizable income gains occurred,
they appear to have come from in large part through increased transfer income|hardly a fulllment
37At least, if it did cause massive income reductions for some women, others must have had similarly sized gains.
33of the stated PRWORA objective to \end the dependence of needy parents on government benets
by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage" (U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Ways and Means (2000)). Our results suggest that if a program like Jobs First is to end
dependence, it is unlikely to do so only through work-related gains: even the comparatively large
treatment eects on the earnings distribution we estimate here are far from large enough to make
most families self-sucient.
One important implication of our results is that people with dierent social welfare functions in
mind can dier on whether Jobs First was a success. Those who place great weight on earnings and
are relatively unconcerned about inequality may reasonably conclude that the program worked well,
especially if they believe that substantial consumption smoothing is feasible. More inequality-averse
observers would conclude the opposite; the social welfare loss is especially great when consumption
smoothing is not feasible and inequality aversion is high.
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1000Figure 6: Quantile treatment eects on the distribution of earnings
(weighting done by inverse-propensity score, horizontal dashed line is mean treatment eect)




Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter













Weight: inverse p−score; earnings averaged over Q1t7













Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter













Weight: inverse p−score; earnings averaged over Q8t16













Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter













Weight: inverse p−score; earnings averaged over Q1t16









1000Figure 7: Quantile treatment eects on the distribution of transfers
(weighting done by inverse-propensity score, horizontal dashed line is mean treatment eect)




Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter













Weight: inverse p−score; transfers averaged over Q1t7













Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter













Weight: inverse p−score; transfers averaged over Q8t16













Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter













Weight: inverse p−score; transfers averaged over Q1t16









1000Figure 8: Quantile treatment eects on the distribution of income
(weighting done by inverse-propensity score, horizontal dashed line is mean treatment eect)




Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter













Weight: inverse p−score; total income averaged over Q1t7













Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter













Weight: inverse p−score; total income averaged over Q8t16













Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter













Weight: inverse p−score; total income averaged over Q1t16












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Appendix Figure 1: Inverse CDFs for earnings distributions (person-quarter is unit of observation,
weighting done by inverse-propensity score, horizontal dashed line is mean treatment eect)




Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter














Weight: inverse p−score; earnings averaged over Q1t7














Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter














Weight: inverse p−score; earnings averaged over Q8t16














Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter














Weight: inverse p−score; earnings averaged over Q1t16











55Appendix Figure 2: Inverse CDFs for transfers distributions (person-quarter is unit of observation,
weighting done by inverse-propensity score, horizontal dashed line is mean treatment eect)




Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter














Weight: inverse p−score; transfers averaged over Q1t7














Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter














Weight: inverse p−score; transfers averaged over Q8t16














Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter














Weight: inverse p−score; transfers averaged over Q1t16











56Appendix Figure 3: Inverse CDFs for income distributions (person-quarter is unit of observation,
weighting done by inverse-propensity score, horizontal dashed line is mean treatment eect)




Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter














Weight: inverse p−score; total income averaged over Q1t7














Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter














Weight: inverse p−score; total income averaged over Q8t16














Weight: inverse p−score; unit of obs is person−quarter














Weight: inverse p−score; total income averaged over Q1t16
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